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Abstract 
This paper e laborates a t h e o r e t i c a l framework for 
conceptua l i z ing r e l a t i onsh ips between group s t ructure and 
informat ion exchange. The framework focuses on processes by 
which s t ructure a f f e c t s the f low o f in format ion in 
problem-solv ing attempts which lack we l l -deve loped so lut ion 
paradigms. In our formulat ion, status orders based on member 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in f luence the amount, t ype , source, and t a rge t o f 
message exchanges. 
Our basic unit o f ana lys i s i s the channel, a one-way l ink 
from a source to a t a r ge t through which a s p e c i f i c type o f 
content may be t ransmit ted . We d i s t ingu i sh among channels for 
t ransmit t ing ideas , p o s i t i v e eva luat ions , nega t i ve eva lua t i ons , 
and data ; we o f f e r propos i t i ons descr ib ing v a r i a t i o n in the use 
o f channels as a funct ion o f expected cos ts and gains being a 
source or t a r g e t o f each type o f channel. These cos ts and gains 
depend on status d i f f e r e n t i a l s between source and t a rge t as we l l 
as type o f channel. 
These propos i t i ons y i e l d t e s t ab l e hypothesis on status 
orders and the transmission o f ideas and nega t i ve eva luat ions 
under cond i t i ons o f publ ic and anonymous sources o f messages. 
Group s t ructure has important consequences f o r the exchange 
o f information in groups and o rgan i za t i ons , consequences that 
increase in importance fo r tasks in which members are 
interdependent . E f f e c t s of s t ruc tura l f a c t o r s on informat ion 
exchange include (1 ) v a r i a t i o n s in the amount o f in format ion sent 
that are independent o f the task- re l evance or qua l i t y o f the 
content , and (2 ) systematic b iases in who transmits what content 
to whom. These s t r u c t u r a l l y induced d i s t o r t i o n s in in format ion 
exchange o f t en lead to d i s c e r n i b l e performance decrements and may 
i n t e r f e r with a group or o rgan i za t i on achiev ing i t s task 
o b j e c t i v e s . 
While the r ecogn i t i on o f d i s func t i ona l e f f e c t s o f group 
structure has led to p r a c t i c a l techniques fo r enhancing the 
amount and qua l i t y o f in format ion exchange, such as the Delphi or 
Nominal Group Techniques (Dalkey and Helmer, 1964; Delbecq and 
Van de Ven, 1971, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) and, more r e c e n t l y , some 
proposals fo r computer-mediated in format ion exchange ( e . g . , 
H i l t z , Johnson, Aronv i th , and T u r o f f , 1980), these e f f o r t s have 
not g ene ra l l y been theo ry -d r i v en . We b e l i e v e that both our 
understanding o f the consequences o f group s t ructure and our 
e f f o r t s to e f f e c t i v e l y manage in format ion exchange in groups 
would b e n e f i t from a c o d i f i c a t i o n o f the ins i gh t s and empir ica l 
f i nd ings o f the l a s t four decades. Hence, we are engaged in the 
development o f t h e o r e t i c a l framework which draws on the work of 
Bales ( e . g . , 1951, 1970), Bavelas ( e . g . , 1950; a lso see L e a v i t t , 
1951), and the i r a ssoc i a t e s , and the formulat ions and empir ica l 
research o f the Expectation States Research Program. In th i s 
paper, we w i l l present an i n i t i a l statement o f our theory and a 
set o f hypotheses drawn from th i s statement. 
We begin by not ing that s o c i a l o rgan i za t i on t y p i c a l l y 
imposes r e s t r i c t i o n s or cons t ra in ts on informat ion exchange among 
i t s members. Such cons t ra in ts are sometimes byproducts o f r o l e 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n o f func t i on . In other cases, 
in format ion exchange i s constrained pr imar i l y as a means o f 
c on t r o l , i . e . , to maintain l eadersh ip and i n f l u e n c e . 
Bureaucracies, f o r example, t y p i c a l l y have we l l de f ined 
channels o f communication which are l im i t ed or proscr ibed to 
members based on rank or p o s i t i o n . Moreover, p o s i t i v e and 
negat i ve sanct ions f r equent l y support the adherence to 
cons t ra in t s on communication channels. Since the f l ow o f 
in format ion o f t en serves mul t ip l e func t i ons , i t becomes important 
to understand the f u l l range o f outcomes o f in format ion 
cons t ra in ts in s o c i a l o r gan i za t i ons . In doing t h i s we 
immediately observe that in format ion cons t ra in t s in the s e r v i c e 
o f one goal o f t en have unintended but d i s func t i ona l consequences 
f o r other g o a l s . For example, the same cons t ra in t s on 
in format ion exchange that serve coord inat ion and con t ro l may 
s e r i ous l y i n t e r f e r e with the f low o f f a c tua l in format ion and 
o b j e c t i v e eva luat ions and the exchange o f ideas . This may occur 
because when in format ion provided by a subordinate un i t , group, 
or ind i v idua l i s the bas is fo r eva luat ion o f t h e i r performance 
and/or the a l l o c a t i o n of resources , i t becomes in the i n t e r e s t o f 
the source to r e s t r i c t or bias i t s content . 
While the f o rego ing discussion o f in format ion exchange i s in 
the context o f bureaucrat ic o r gan i za t i on , we b e l i e v e that such 
con t rad i c to ry outcomes of information exchange p o t e n t i a l l y occur 
in any h i e r a r c h i c a l c o l l e c t i v e . Fundamental processes remain 
ope ra t i v e across d i f f e r e n c e s in s i z e and complex i ty . Research on 
small group problem so l v i ng , f o r example, has documented the 
e f f e c t s o f s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on i n t e r a c t i on among group 
members (Berger , 1958). I t i s c l ea r that even informal groups 
tend to be h i e r a r c h i c a l l y organ ized ; actual or imagined 
d i f f e r e n c e s in task r e l e van t a b i l i t i e s and v a r i a t i o n in other 
v i s i b l e member c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t y p i c a l l y r e su l t in a s t ructur ing 
o f the members in a power and p r e s t i g e order (Berger , Cohen, and 
Ze ld i t ch , 1972). 
The development o f a t h e o r e t i c a l framework as undertaken in 
t h i s paper w i l l formulate mechanisms by which s tructure a f f e c t s 
the f l ow o f in format ion in problem-solv ing a c t i v i t y . We 
i n i t i a l l y focus on group prob lem-so lv ing , but consider the 
framework to be app l i cab l e to other forms o f a c t i v i t y , e . g . , 
c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , and across soc i a l and o r gan i za t i ona l 
con t ex t s . 
The framework to be presented attempts to i n t e g r a t e e x i s t i ng 
knowledge from severa l d i f f e r e n t research t r a d i t i o n s . The next 
sect ion w i l l ou t l i n e a view o f s t ructure and process in 
in format ion exchange within problem-solv ing groups. We w i l l 
f i r s t d i s t ingu i sh severa l general c l asses o f formal problems 
groups t y p i c a l l y f ace and s p e c i f y a f o ca l problem c lass f o r the 
present i nqu i r y . We w i l l then b r i e f l y turn to c o g n i t i v e 
processes in problem so lv ing and the i r r e l a t i onsh ip s to the 
in terpersona l exchange o f in format ion . F i n a l l y , we w i l l take up 
the operat ion and consequences o f s o c i a l s t ructure in i n t e r a c t i v e 
groups. These d iscuss ions w i l l then become the bas is f o r an 
i n i t i a l statement o f a formal theory o f group structure and 
in format ion exchange. 
Conceptual Foundations f o r a Theory of Group Structure 
and Informat ion Exchange 
In t h i s s e c t i on , we w i l l ou t l i ne conceptual foundations that 
support a formal theory o f group s t ructure and informat ion 
exchange in problem s o l v i n g . We begin with a cons idera t ion o f 
problem t y p o l o g i e s and the i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to c o g n i t i v e processes 
in group problem s o l v i n g . 
C l a s s i f y i n g Problems in Terms o f Their Structuredness. 
Although experimental s tudies o f group problem so lv ing have 
t y p i c a l l y genera l i z ed the i r f i nd ings across problem types , we 
b e l i e v e there are important d i f f e r e n c e s in problem dimensions 
that a f f e c t underlying c o g n i t i v e processes , the type and amount 
o f in format ion exchanged, and the in f luence o f group structure on 
so lu t ion q u a l i t y . Accord ing ly , we begin our d iscuss ion by 
suggest ing a t ypo logy for problem c l a s s e s . 
For the d iscuss ion that f o l l o w s , we adopt MacCrimmon and 
T a y l o r ' s (1976) d i s t i n c t i o n s between we l l - s t ruc tu r ed , 
semi-s tructured, and i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, and a l go r i thmic , 
h e u r i s t i c , and " c r e a t i v e " responses. We would cha rac t e r i z e 
we l l - s t ruc tured problems by the a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f a l l in format ion 
needed to so lve the problem. Since ex is tant knowledge bases most 
o f t en prov ide t r ans f e r ab l e so lut ion paradigms and rout in i zed 
so lut ion procedures, a lgor i thmic responses are g ene ra l l y adequate 
f o r th i s problem c l a s s . 
In the case o f semi-structured problems, enough informat ion 
i s a v a i l a b l e to p a r t i a l l y de f ine the "nature" o f the knowledge 
gap and some t r ans f e r o f information on the connectedness o f 
problem elements. However, l i m i t a t i o n s in the knowledge base 
preclude e x c l u s i v e l y a lgor i thmic responses. In such cases , 
problem-so lvers can opt ima l l y employ " h e u r i s t i c s , " procedures 
that rather than guaranteeing a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer only increase 
the odds o f converging on a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , in i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems there i s g ene ra l l y no 
more than background informat ion on the knowledge gap and l i t t l e 
or no t r ans f e r ab l e so lut ion paradigms. Since c l e a r - cu t 
procedures f o r c l os ing problem gaps do not e x i s t , problem so l v e r s 
must generate connections and so lut ion forms through improvised 
or " c r e a t i v e " response procedures. Issues in the d e f i n i t i o n o f 
such procedures have a long h i s t o r y ( K e l l e y and Thibaut, 1969), 
but few con t ro l l ed studies have evaluated the i r e f f i c a c y . There 
i s a lso controversy as to the commonality and order ing o f 
c o g n i t i v e processes in the so l v ing o f i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem 
( B e l l , 1982). 
Thus, whi le i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems are o f t en complex and of 
c r i t i c a l importance, opera t iona l procedures to generate so lu t ions 
have been e lus i v e and i r r e gu l a r in the i r r e s u l t s (Yet ton and 
Bot tger , 1982). I t i s c l ea r that i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems are 
most t y p i c a l l y taken up by groups o f e xpe r t s . This i s in 
contrast to we l l - s t ruc tured problems which are more t y p i c a l l y 
assigned to ind i v idua l s supported by machine techno logy . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , as d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n in complex 
o rgan i za t ions increase , i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem so lv ing 
inc r eas ing l y invo l v es small group i n t e r a c t i ons o f i nd i v i dua l s 
with d i v e r se personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and expe r t i s e ( S t e i n e r , 
1972). 
While we b e l i e v e that the theory to be presented has some 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y to a l l three types o f problems, we p r imar i l y 
address the c l ass of i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems. We choose t h i s 
because we b e l i e v e that the e f f e c t s o f s o c i a l s t ructure on both 
informat ion exchange and so lut ion qua l i t y w i l l be most s a l i e n t in 
th i s c l ass o f problems. 
Cogn i t i ve Processes and Informat ion Exchange in I l l - S t r u c t u r e d 
Problem So l v ing . 
Most conceptua l i za t i ons o f the c o g n i t i v e processses 
underlying problem so lv ing behavior suggest an i n t e rp l a y o f 
convergent and d i ve rgent thinking that v a r i e s across both phases 
in so lut ion generat ion and problem types . As used here, 
convergent thinking r e f e r s to operat ions that lead to s ingular 
" c o r r e c t " s o lu t i ons . This a b i l i t y c l a ss i s represented in 
i n t e l l i g e n c e and achievement measures. Divergent thinking r e f e r s 
to operat ions that are d i r ec t ed to generat ing a l a r ge number o f 
d isparate so lu t ions that meet no s ingular c r i t e r i o n o f 
" c o r r e c t n e s s . " This l a t t e r c l ass o f operat ions has been 
discussed as a bas is o f c r e a t i v e th ink ing . 
In such v iews, problem d e f i n i t i o n and idea eva luat ion depend 
for the most part on convergent thinking operat ions while idea 
generat ion t y p i c a l l y e n t a i l s d i ve rgent th ink ing . Considering 
problem types , we would expect we l l - s t ruc tured problems to 
emphasize convergent thinking operat ions in the matching o f 
problem to known procedures and th e i r implementations. 
I l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, in con t ras t , would be expected to depend 
more on d i ve rgent thinking operat ions to generate so lu t i ons that 
meet no s ingular c r i t e r i o n o f c o r r e c tness . 
In group problem so l v ing , we would corresponding ly expect 
d i f f e r e n t types o f in format ion to be exchanged during d i f f e r e n t 
c o g n i t i v e ope ra t i ons . For example, we would expect the 
convergent thinking operat ions in problem d e f i n i t i o n and idea 
eva luat ion to be t y p i f i e d by the exchange o f f a c t s and 
eva lua t i ons , whereas the d i ve rgent thinking operat ions o f 
so lut ion generat ion should show r e l a t i v e l y g rea te r exchange o f 
i d ea t i ona l in fo rmat ion . 
Soc ia l Organizat ion in I n t e r a c t i v e Groups 
Along with formal problem so lv ing opera t i ons , we expect 
other soc ia l processes to occur in i n t e r a c t i v e groups. Among the 
most important o f these i s the emergence and maintenance o f a 
h i e r a r ch i ca l s t ructure or status o rder . As a consequence, 
in format ion exchange in an i n t e r a c t i v e group serves severa l 
func t i ons . The f i r s t o f these r e l a t e s to the problem so lv ing 
task, whi le the second has importance to the d e f i n i t i o n and 
maintenance o f soc ia l o rde r ; each a f f e c t s the amount and type o f 
in format ion exchanged. To understand the f low o f in format ion in 
i n t e r a c t i v e groups, one must understand the components o f these 
funct ions and the i r e t i o l o g i e s . 
Having b r i e f l y considered in format ion exchange in support o f 
the c o g n i t i v e opera t ions o f problem so l v ing , we now turn to 
in format ion exchange in support o f the h i e r a r ch i ca l soc ia l 
s t ructure o f the group. In the d iscuss ion to f o l l ow we w i l l 
consider the o rgan i za t i on and operat ion o f group s o c i a l s t ructure 
and i t s e f f e c t s on the amount and type o f in format ion exchanged 
in i n t e r a c t i o n . 
Status Organiz ing Processes in I n t e r a c t i v e Groups. From the 
e a r l y work o f Bales to current work in the Expectat ion States 
research program, researchers have focussed on in terpersona l 
eva luat ion as one o f the key mechanisms l ink ing soc ia l s t ructure 
to group i n t e r a c t i o n . Evalution processes play a s i g n i f i c a n t 
part in accounting fo r the two major types o f empir ica l f i nd ings 
in these research t r a d i t i o n s ; (1 ) the emergence o f a status order 
in groups whose members are i n i t i a l l y u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d with 
respect to s a l i e n t status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as race , sex, 
o r gan i za t i ona l p o s i t i o n , and task competence; and ( 2 ) the 
capac i t y o f a p r e - ex i s t i ng status order that i s external to the 
group to organize a status h ierarchy in the group even when the 
bas is o f the ex terna l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s t o t a l l y unrelated to the 
group t a sk . For Expectat ion States t h e o r i s t s , the concept o f an 
expectat ion s t a t e—a r e l a t i o n a l construct incorporat ing an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e l i e f s about h i s own competence v i s - ' a - v i s the 
others with whom he was in terac t ing—accompl ished the l i nkage ; an 
ind iv idua l de f e r r ed to o thers f o r whom he held higher 
expectat ions than he held for h imse l f , and thus ind i v idua l s in 
i n t e r a c t i on are t rea ted unequally because they are thought to 
have unequal t ask - r e l e van t a b i l i t i e s . Once high expec ta t i ons are 
formed for a s p e c i f i c member, he or she i s : (1 ) encouraged to 
t a l k more, ( 2 ) more l i k e l y to be perce ived as having good ideas , 
(3 ) l e s s l i k e l y to encounter disagreement, and (4 ) g ene ra l l y 
allowed more i n f l u e n c e . 
Evaluation processes , however, play an important r o l e in 
determining an i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - o t h e r expec ta t i ons . Ind i v idua l s 
in i n t e r a c t i on communicate both very s p e c i f i c and very 
g e n e r a l i z e d , d i f f u s e eva lua t i ons ; f o r example, A can t e l l B that 
she agrees with B ' s l a s t suggest ion or she can t e l l B that she 
l i k e s B's s t y l e . Berger and Snel l (1962) , in a s tochas t i c model 
o f the act ion process by which a h ierarchy emerges, l im i t ed 
themselves to very s p e c i f i c "un i t e va lua t i ons " ; each "performance 
output" by an actor leads to a unit eva luat ion o f that 
performance. These unit eva luat ions bui ld up expec ta t ion s ta t es 
which then in f luence l a t e r unit eva lua t i ons . In c on t ras t , the 
process by which d i f f u s e status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a f f e c t s group 
in t e rac t i on and group structure invo lved genera l i z ed eva luat ions 
such as the g l oba l nega t i ve s t e reo types assoc iated with race 
(Berger e t a l . , 1966, 1972). 
That people d i f f e r e n t i a l l y eva luate occupants o f d i f f e r e n t 
status l e v e l s c o n s t i t u t e s a p r inc ipa l underlying property o f 
status h i e r a r c h i e s . The re f o r e , one should expect that 
in terpersona l eva luat ions cont r ibute to the emergence o f a 
h ierarchy and that h i e ra r ch i e s a f f e c t in te rpersona l e va lua t i ons . 
Furthermore, g iven the ex is tence o f a h i e rarchy , a l l eva luat ions 
o f a s p e c i f i c act ion do not ca r ry the same we ight ; eva luat ions 
from higher status eva luators undoubtedly have more impact than 
those from lower status eva luators (Berger , Cohen, and Ze ld i t ch , 
1972). 
Expectation States research thus informs us about the 
format ion, s t a b i l i t y , and operat ion o f power -pres t i ge h i e ra r ch i e s 
and the general r o l e o f eva luat ion processes. In the d iscuss ion 
that f o l l o w s , we w i l l use the communication o f eva lua t i ons as 
bui ld ing blocks to look more c l o s e l y at the i n t e rac t i on process 
as that process operates to so l ve the group problem and to 
construct and maintain the group s t ruc ture . This use i s roughly 
analogous to the use o f "un i t e va lua t i on " concept as a bui ld ing 
block in the formation o f expectat ion s t a t e s . 
In our v iew, communications o f eva lua t i ons represent 
c r i t i c a l aspects o f information exchange in problem so l v ing . On 
one hand, such communications cont r ibute to the emergence and/or 
maintenance o f the status o rder . On the other hand, eva luat ions 
can cont r ibute to problem-solv ing funct ions by d i sc r imina t ing 
qua l i t y and d i r e c t i o n in i dea t i on . Furthermore, not only actual 
communication but an t i c ipa ted communication impacts both se ts o f 
func t i ons ; concern for avoiding nega t i ve eva luat ions from 
super iors o f t en prevents e s s en t i a l in format ion exchange as the 
Challenger d i sas t e r wel l i l l u s t r a t e s . We b e l i e v e that actual and 
ant i c ipa ted communication o f eva luat ion l i nk s o c i a l s t ructure to 
the problem so lv ing process and to the outcome o f that process . 
To e xp l i c a t e t h i s v i ew, in the next sec t ion we w i l l b r i e f l y 
consider the connect ions between status o rgan i za t i on and the 
c o g n i t i v e and soc i a l processes underlying in format ion exchange in 
group problem s o l v i n g . 
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Structure and Process in Group Problem So lv ing 
We have thus far presented a typo logy o f problems, a b r i e f 
d iscuss ion o f c o g n i t i v e operat ions and an examination o f the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s tatus s t ruc tures to i n t e r a c t i o n processes . We 
w i l l now turn to the i n t e g ra t i on o f these d i v e r s e content areas . 
We begin with the s p e c i f i c processes that l i nk group s t ruc ture to 
problem so lv ing ope ra t i ons . We b e l i e v e that these are a f f e c t i v e 
processes that emerge in group i n t e r a c t i o n , r e f l e c t the status 
s t ructure o f the group, and in f luence c o g n i t i v e processes 
addressed to so lv ing the group problem. 
Considering a f f e c t i v e processes f i r s t , we note that along 
with s tud ies o f types o f c o g n i t i v e operat ions in problem so l v i ng , 
« 
a concurrent body o f research has dea l t with a f f e c t i v e c o r r e l a t e s 
and f a c i l i t a t i n g and i nh ib i t i n g performance cond i t i ons f o r 
d i f f e r e n t c o g n i t i v e opera t ions ( c f . , Amabile, 1983; Wallach and 
Kogan, 1965). Although the research represents a range o f 
conceptual pe r spec t i v e s , i t e s s e n t i a l l y suggests that while 
e va lua t i v e in format ion may in some cases f a c i l i t a t e convergent 
th ink ing , such in format ion most o f t en has an i nh ib i t i n g e f f e c t on 
d i v e rgen t th ink ing . Pa r t l y in response to such f i n d i n g s , many 
heur i s t i c procedures fo r i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem so lv ing have the 
i n h i b i t i o n o f e x p l i c i t eva luat ion as a primary end. 
However, s ince i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem so lv ing seems to 
depend on the operat ion o f both d i ve rgen t and convergent thinking 
in ordered sequences, outcomes seem more l i k e l y to b e n e f i t from 
procedures that r egu la t e the amount and timing o f the exchange o f 
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eva lua t i v e in fo rmat ion . Such procedures r equ i r e an understanding 
o f sources o f e va lua t i v e in format ion . 
Status E f f e c t s on In format ion Exchange. Consistent with 
previous d i scuss ion , we propose that the d i r e c t i o n and amount o f 
e v a lua t i v e in format ion exchanged in i n t e rac t ing groups are 
funct ions o f s tatus organiz ing and maintenance processes. The 
research and theory c i t ed above al lows strong in f e r ences about 
the consequences o f s tatus d i f f e r e n c e s for the f l ow o f 
in format ion in genera l and e va lua t i v e in format ion in p a r t i c u l a r . 
For example, we would o r d i n a r i l y expect nega t i ve eva luat ions to 
be d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y sent by h igh-s ta tus persons and d i r ec ted 
toward low-status persons and t h e i r communications. 
Correspondingly, the content o f l ow-s ta tus persons' 
communications should predominately be p o s i t i v e eva luat ions which 
are d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y d i r ec t ed toward h igh-s ta tus persons. As 
we have noted, these s t ruc tura l sources o f the f low o f e va lua t i v e 
in format ion represent sender c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are o f t en 
independent o f the substant ive content o f the in format ion . The 
d i s f u n c t i o n a l e f f e c t o f asymmetric communication i s i n t e n s i f i e d 
i f , as i s o f t en the case , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as age or rank 
rather than t a sk - r e l e van t a b i l i t i e s are the bas i s o f s tatus 
pos i t i on in the soc ia l h i e rarchy . 
Thus, we may expect that the status order o f i n t e r a c t i v e 
groups w i l l s y s t ema t i c a l l y shape t h e i r communication so that 
i n i t i a l l y medium- and low-status i nd i v i dua l s send p ropor t i ona t e l y 
more f a c t s and p o s i t i v e eva luat ions and corresponding ly fewer 
ideas and nega t i ve eva luat ions than h igh-s ta tus i n d i v i d u a l s . Our 
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discussion o f c o g n i t i v e operat ions in problem so l v i ng , l eads us 
to expect that such d i s t o r t i o n s in the t r ans f e r o f i dea t i ona l 
in format ion have pa r t i cu la r importance f o r i l l - s t r u c t u r e d 
problems. 
In i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, hypothes is generat ion assumes 
g rea te r importance than in semi- or we l l - s t ruc tured problems 
because the connectedness o f problem elements i s l e s s we l l 
d e f i n ed , and so lut ion procedures, even i f known, can not be as 
r e a d i l y l inked to poor ly s p e c i f i e d problems. E f f e c t i v e n e s s in 
hypotheses generat ion c l e a r l y depends on unencumbered idea 
i n i t i a t i o n and minimal but o b j e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n - - e x a c t l y the 
processes that are most d i s t o r t ed in h i e r a r c h i c a l groups. 
We would fur ther observe that s ince ( 1 ) there i s t y p i c a l l y 
l i t t l e a b i l i t y in the group to recogn i ze i n i t i a l l y which members 
are cons i s t en t sources o f super ior ideas , and ( 2 ) convergence on 
a s ing l e so lut ion i s not a major f ea ture o f the c o g n i t i v e 
ope ra t i ons , s o c i a l h i e r a r ch i za t i on can have s i g n i f i c a n t cos ts to 
outcomes o f hypothes is genera t i on . 
In contrast to hypothesis genera t i on , we note that 
hypothes is eva luat ion t y p i c a l l y i s based on a g rea te r exchange o f 
f a c t s and shared eva lu t i ons which are seen as l e s s r i s k y to 
members than the exchange o f ideas. Thus, soc ia l h ierarchy 
e f f e c t s on in format ion t rans f e r may i n t e r f e r e l e s s with the 
exchange o f hypothes is eva luat ions and t h e i r cont r ibut ion to the 
q u a l i t y o f f i n a l s o lu t i ons . In cases where member pos i t i ons in 
the h ierarchy are based on a b i l i t y r e l e van t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 
h i e r a r ch i ca l o ran i za t i on may in f a c t cont r ibute to the outcome o f 
hypothes is eva luat ion by weighting knowledgeable communications 
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most h igh ly and reducing the time the group takes to converge on 
a s ing l e s o l u t i o n . 
For i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, then, the asymmetric 
communication o f eva luat ion that occurs in h i e ra r ch i e s i s l i k e l y 
to have both i n h i b i t o r y and f a c i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s . In the idea -
generat ion phase, actual or ant i c ipated nega t i ve eva luat ion may 
c o n s t r i c t the f low o f ideas . But in the idea-eva luat ion phase, 
communication o f eva luat ion may promote the strengthening or 
d iscard ing o f weak ideas . In the f i n a l sec t ions to f o l l o w , we 
w i l l attempt to f o rma l i ze and e laborate on the mechanisms that 
produce these e f f e c t s with a set o f t h e o r e t i c a l p r opos i t i ons . 
A Heur i s t i c Theory o f Structure-Mediated Evaluat ion and 
In format ion Exchange 
While our framework i s in an ea r l y s tage o f development and 
i s a f i r s t approximation to represent ing the processes invo l v ed , 
we b e l i e v e i t i s a use fu l way to s t ructure s y s t emat i ca l l y the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s among i n f l u e n t i a l v a r i a b l e s in informat ion exchange 
and problem-solv ing in i n t e r a c t i v e groups. Although we w i l l 
present the theory in the form o f a set o f p ropos i t i ons , i t i s 
not yet s u f f i c i e n t l y formal i zed to a l low us to deduce 
consequences from these propos i t i ons in a r i go rous manner. We 
are , however, ab le to ex t rac t t e s t a b l e hypotheses about processes 
o f information exchange and t h e i r consequences fo r group 
problem-solv ing from the propos i t i ons in the present form. 
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Unit o f Ana lys i s and O b j e c t i v e s , The basic unit o f the model i s 
the "CHANNEL" which i s de f ined as a one-way l ink from a 
par t i cu la r source ( S [ i ] ) to a par t i cu la r t a r g e t ( T [ j ] ) through 
which a s p e c i f i c type o f content may be t ransmi t ted . We should 
emphasize that in t h i s v iew, a channel i s not simply a neutra l 
conduit l i k e a telephone l i n e ( e . g . , Bavelas, 1950), but depends 
on the type o f content that f lows through i t as wel l as i t s 
address; a use fu l analogy may be a set o f p ipes , one r e s t r i c t e d 
to t ransmit t ing water, one fo r o i l and one f o r natural gas, each 
with s p e c i f i c d e s t i na t i ons . Fol lowing t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , there are 
M(K) (K-1 ) po t en t i a l channels where M = the number o f in format ion 
modes and K = the number o f group members. For the present , we 
r e s t r i c t channels to f i v e types o f in format ion content " ( 1 ) Task 
data (D) ; ( 2 ) Solut ion proposals ( I ) ; ( 3 ) P o s i t i v e Evaluations 
( P ) ; ( 4 ) Negat i ve Evaluations ( N ) ; ( 5 ) Source and Third Party 
data ( E ) . While the f i r s t four are s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y , E channels 
requ i re some a m p l i f i c a t i o n . E channels transmit data about the 
Source or the Sources' eva luat ion o f a par t i cu la r t a rge t to group 
members other than the t a r g e t . Thus, we use E channels to 
represent S [ i ] ' s comment about T [ j ] as i t i s overheard by o the r s . 
As t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i nd i ca t e s , a channel i s an ana l y t i c 
construct that a l lows us to s p e c i f y important elements o f an 
actual in format ion t r a n s f e r . Channels may be a v a i l a b l e but not 
used and, in an actual group, many channels may be i n e x t r i c a b l y 
t i ed together so that use o f one means use o f a l l the o the r s . In 
a f a c e - t o - f a c e group, for example, source i t ransmit t ing a 
Negat ive Evaluation to Target j , [ N ( S [ i ] > T [ j ] ) ] , a lso invo l ves 
t ransmit t ing th i rd party information to a l l other t a r g e t s , i . e . , 
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i nvo l ves the use of E channels to a l l other t a r g e t s . In 
par t i cu la r cases , the medium of communication or the norms o f the 
groups or what K i e s l e r (1984) c a l l s the " e t i q u e t t e " o f group 
in t e rac t i on may c l o se some o f these channels so that they are 
unava i lab le . 
The p r inc ipa l aims o f our model a re : ( 1 ) to represent key 
f a c t o r s that a f f e c t a g iven source 's usage o f a g iven channel ; 
( 2 ) to represent the consequences o f usage o f that channel to the 
source, the t a r g e t , and the group, and (3 ) to represent the 
aggregate consequences o f the use o f a l l channels f o r the content 
o f information exchange in the group. Although we recogn i ze that 
group i n t e r a c t i o n has emergent p rope r t i e s beyond those that can 
be represented by the aggregat ion o f dyadic r e l a t i o n s , in t h i s 
f i r s t formulat ion we t r ea t the channels as having add i t i v e 
e f f e c t s across i nd i v i dua l s and types o f in fo rmat ion . 
Basic D e f i n i t i o n s . We begin the expos i t i on by de f i n ing the basic 
terms we w i l l use to s t a t e our p ropos i t i ons : Status 
D i f f e r e n t i a l , Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l , Expected Cost and Expected Gain. 
Let the STATUS DIFFERENTIAL be the d i f f e r e n c e between 
the status in the group o f the source and the status in 
the group o f a g iven t a r g e t . I f S [ i ] has higher status 
than T [ j ] then the STATUS DIFFERENTIAL i s p o s i t i v e . 
The status d i f f e r e n t i a l can be the r e su l t an t o f comparing 
S [ i ] and T [ j ] on a number o f status dimensions inc luding both 
task - r e l e van t and nontask-re levant status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . S [ i ] 
can have more technica l competence than T [ j ] whi le T [ j ] has more 
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s e n i o r i t y than S [ i ] ; the status d i f f e r e n t i a l would then be a 
weighted combination o f the competence d i f f e r e n c e and the 
s e n i o r i t y d i f f e r e n c e . 
Let COST DIFFERENTIAL o f using a g iven channel be 
de f ined as the EXPECTED COST o f using that channel 
minus the EXPECTED GAIN from using i t ; ( t h i s order ing 
of Expected cost and Expected Gain in Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l 
w i l l a l low subsequent propos i t i ons in Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l 
to be more i n t u i t i v e . ) 
where: 
and 
The EXPECTED COST o f using a channel i s the p r o b a b i l i t y 
that the Source w i l l become a Target for an N channel 
( n e g a t i v e eva lua t i on ) weighted by an est imate o f the 
amount o f l o s s o f s tatus or se l f - es t eem to S r e su l t i ng 
from r ece i v ing that nega t i v e e va lua t i on . 
The EXPECTED GAIN o f using a channel i s the p r o b a b i l i t y 
that the Source w i l l become a Target for a P channel 
weighted by an est imate o f the amount o f gain in status 
or se l f - es t eem to S r e su l t i ng from r e c e i v i n g that 
p o s i t i v e e va lua t i on . 
We consider EXPECTED COSTS and EXPECTED GAINS to be separate 
dimensions that may vary independent ly . In other words, one i s 
not the inverse o f the o the r ; a f a c t o r can a f f e c t a Source 's 
EXPECTED COST and not e f f e c t that Source 's EXPECTED GAIN. Even 
when a fac to r a f f e c t s both, the e f f e c t may be asymmetric, e . g . , 
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when a fac to r produces a unit change in EXPECTED GAIN, i t may 
produce much more than a unit change in EXPECTED COST. While we 
formulate these as "expected va lue" concepts , in t h i s expos i t i on 
we w i l l only make use o f ord ina l comparisons as, f o r example, i f 
S [ i ] uses an N channel to T [ j ] where the STATUS DIFFEERENTIAL i s 
nega t i v e the cost i s higher than i f N ( S [ i ] > T [ k ] ) where the 
STATUS DIFFERENTIAL i s p o s i t i v e . 
We have chosen to focus on ind iv idua l concerns with ga ins 
and l o s s es o f s tatus and se l f - es teem and t h e i r consequences for 
the f l ow o f e v a l u a t i v e in fo rmat ion . Such a focus i s cons i s t en t 
with our view o f the importance o f these processes to the amount 
and qua l i t y o f i d ea t i on in i n t e r a c t i v e groups. 
In t h i s v i ew, the f low o f i n i t i a l ideas , the i r 
a m p l i f i c a t i o n , c l a r i f i c a t i o n , t rans fo rmat ion , and acceptance by 
the group i s most c l o s e l y r e l a t ed to the d i r e c t i o n , amount, and 
sequence o f p o s i t i v e and negat i ve eva luat ion ( i . e . , the use o f N 
and P channe ls ) . 
With these d e f i n i t i o n s , we can now turn to the propos i t i ons 
o f the model. The d r i v ing f o r ce o f the model i s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
concern over l o s s o f s e l f - e s t e em and status in the g roup ' s s o c i a l 
h ierarchy or other groups to which members be long. Thus, an 
ind i v idua l i s motivated to use a channel in order to prevent 
status and se l f - e s t eem l o s ses due to the group 's f a i l u r e to so lve 
i t s problem and/or to gain status and s e l f - e s t e e m . A person i s 
constrained from using a channel because o f poss ib l e negat i ve 
eva luat ions from others which r e s u l t in l o s s es to se l f - e s t eem and 
status. In the present formulat ion, we assume that ant i c ipa ted 
cos ts o f group f a i l u r e (and ant ic ipated b e n e f i t s o f group 
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success) are constant f o r a l l members and exogeneously 
determined. 
P ropos i t i ons 
We begin with three propos i t i ons that serve as background 
f o r subsequent p ropos i t i ons and d e r i v a t i v e hypotheses. 
1. BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 
P1.1 I l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem so lv ing i s f a c i l i t a t e d when the 
process o f generat ing ideas i s separated from the 
process o f eva luat ing ideas . 
P1.2 Qual i ty in problem so lv ing i s f a c i l i t a t e d when the 
eva lua t i on o f an idea i s separated from the eva luat ion 
o f the person who i s the source o f the idea . 
P1.3 Where so lu t i on paradigms do not e x i s t ( i l l - s t r u c t u r e d 
problems) , ideas that e n t a i l high po t en t i a l cost to 
t h e i r Source are necessary f o r the group to have any 
chance o f so lv ing the problems. 
Propos i t i on 1.1 may be seen as an inherent consequence o f 
the s e n s i t i v i t y o f ideat ion to evaluat ion and nega t i ve a f f e c t . 
This p ropos i t i on has i t s bases in formulat ions from d iverse 
t h e o r e t i c a l pe rspec t i v es in soc ia l psychology ( e . g . , Amabile, 
1985, Wallach and Kogan, 1965). 
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In our te rmino logy , we w i l l suggest that throughout the l i f e 
o f the group, a l l members perce ive expected cos ts to exceed 
expected ga ins from using I channels. Separating the use o f I 
channels from the use of N channels would t h e r e f o r e decrease the 
expected cost to members o f using the former and increase the 
t o t a l number o f ideas . 
P2. 1 has a r a t i o n a l e s imi lar to that f o r P1.1; separat ing 
the ind iv idua l from the idea again lowers the p r o b a b i l i t y that 
being a source o f I channel usage w i l l r e s u l t in being the t a r g e t 
o f an N channel. 
In P1.3, we observe that by d e f i n i t i o n i l l - s t r u c t u r e d 
problems r equ i r e more uncommon ideas to span or l i nk t h e i r 
problem elements than do we l l - s t ruc tured problems. Such ideas 
are commonly perceived as increasing the p r o b a b i l i t y o f being the 
t a rge t o f an N channel communication more than they increase the 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f being the t a r g e t o f a P channel communication. 
2. CHANNEL CHOICE 
P2. 1 The p r o b a b i l i t y that a Source w i l l use a g iven channel 
inc reases as the Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l o f using that 
channel decreases . 
P2.2 Given an opt ion among channels, a source w i l l choose 
the channe l ( s ) with the l e a s t Cost Di f f e r e n t i a l ( s) . 
As we have de f ined the terms, when a Source expects more 
gains than c o s t s , the Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l w i l l be negat i ve and the 
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p r o b a b i l i t y o f a g i ven channe l ' s usage w i l l increase s ince the 
Source expec ts g r e a t e r g a i n s . These p r o p o s i t i o n s r e f e r to 
cho i c e s o f both t a r g e t s and t ypes o f in fo rmat ion in the set o f 
a v a i l a b l e channe ls ; when channels to d i f f e r e n t t a r g e t s are t i ed 
toge ther as in f a c e - t o - f a c e groups, a source may choose subsets 
ra ther than i n d i v i d u a l channels . 
3. COST DIFFERENTIAL 
The Expected Cost and Expected Gain o f being a TARGET and 
SOURCE o f communication are both r e l e v a n t to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f using a channe l . We assume that in cons ide r ing 
whether to be a SOURCE each person takes the p o s i t i o n o f a TARGET 
o f va r i ous t ypes o f i n f o rmat i on and c a l c u l a t e s the c o s t s and 
ga ins he may expect as a r e s u l t o f using a channel . Thus, we 
precede p r o p o s i t i o n s on the SOURCE'S expected cos t s and cost 
d i f f e r e n t i a l by a p r opos i t i on on the TARGET'S expected c o s t . 
P3. 1 For a person i , the EXPECTED COST o f being the TARGET 
o f an N channel from a Source S [ j ] i nc reases as the 
STATUS DIFFERENTIAL between i and j becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y n e g a t i v e ( i . e . , j becomes o f i n c r e a s i n g l y 
higher s tatus than i ) . 
P r opos i t i on 3. 1 fo rmulates the t a r g e t ' s percept ion that 
n e g a t i v e e va lua t i ons are more c o s t l y from higher s tatus Sources. 
Even i f the p r o b a b i l i t y o f using an N channel did not vary with 
the s ta tus o f the Source, the n e g a t i v e consequences o f being a 
t a r g e t o f an N channel are g r ea t e r from higher s ta tus sources . 
21 
For example, in the case o f f o rma l l y o rgan i zed groups, i t i s 
obvious tha t a n e g a t i v e e va lua t i on from one ' s super io r i s much 
more se r i ous than one from a peer . Even in in fo rma l groups a 
n e g a t i v e e va lua t i on from one b e l i e v e d to be higher in competence 
can be more damaging to the t a r g e t ' s s e l f - e s t e e m . 
P3.2 and P. 3. 3 use P3- 1 to s ta t e the SOURCE'S p e r s p e c t i v e on 
Expected Cost. 
P3.2 The EXPECTED COST to person i o f being a SOURCE 
( S [ i ] > T [ j ] ) in any t ype o f channel inc reases as the 
STATUS DIFFERENTIAL between S [ i ] and T [ j ] ) becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y n e g a t i v e . 
P3.3 The COST DIFFERENTIAL to person i o f being a SOURCE 
( S [ i ] > T [ j ] ) in any t ype o f channel inc r eases as the 
STATUS DIFFERENTIAL between S [ i ] and T [ j ] becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y n e g a t i v e . 
In p r o p o s i t i o n s 3.2 and 3 .3 person i i s app ly ing the r e s u l t s 
o f h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s o f h is p o t e n t i a l as a t a r g e t to h is fu tu r e 
r o l e as a Source. Maintaining the assumption o f a constant 
p r o b a b i l i t y that usage o f a g i v en channel w i l l r e s u l t in the 
t a r g e t ' s n e g a t i v e response , the cos t o f tha t n e g a t i v e response 
w i l l increase with inc reases in the r e l a t i v e s ta tus o f the 
t a r g e t . 
We note that these p ropos i t i ons pos i t b e l i e f s o f the Source 
which may or may not have any r e l a t i o n to the actual s i t u a t i o n . 
Sometimes the person 's percept ions w i l l be an adequate bas is f o r 
expec ta t i ons , but at other times soc ia l processes w i l l d i s t o r t 
the percept ions and the expec ta t i ons based on them. This point 
i s important because, as we have prev ious ly noted and w i l l 
subsequently argue, status organiz ing processes are o f t en based 
on ind iv idua l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are minimal ly r e l a t ed to 
problem requirements or t ask - r e l e van t a b i l i t i e s . We should also 
re-emphasize that these expectat ions are r e l a t i v e , not 
absolute to S [ i ] , a high status Source, there may be ve ry 
l i t t l e expected cost with e i t h e r ( S [ i ] > T [ j ] ) or 
( S [ i ] >T [ k ] ) , but i f the status d i f f e r e n t i a l between i and j 
i s more nega t i v e ( o r l e s s po s i t i v e since STATUS DIFFERENTIALS are 
symmetric) than the d i f f e r e n t i a l between i and k, then the 
EXPECTED COST o f the former channel would be g rea te r than the 
EXPECTED COST o f the l a t t e r . 
The e f f e c t s o f p o s i t i v e eva luat ions from high status sources 
are more b e n e f i c i a l than p o s i t i v e eva luat ions from equal or low 
status sources, but propos i t i ons about p o s i t i v e eva luat ions and 
status ga ins are not mirror images o f 3.1 and 3 .2 . Since we 
focus on nega t i v e eva luat ions and c o s t s , we omit propos i t i ons 
about p o s i t i v e eva luat ions to avoid add i t i ona l complex i ty . 
P3-4 For a g iven T, an N channel i s more l i k e l y than an I 
channel to have a nega t i v e COST DIFFERENTIAL and an I 
channel i s more l i k e l y than a D channel to have a 
nega t i ve COST DIFFERENTIAL. 
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P3.5 For a g iven T, in the absence o f s o c i a l c ons t ra in t s , 
the COST DIFFERENTIAL o f an I channel i s more l i k e l y to 
be nega t i v e than p o s i t i v e . 
where: 
SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS are mechanisms that separate 
eva luat ions of products from eva luat ions o f Persons 
producing those products or l i m i t COST DIFFERENTIALS to 
a g iven Source from a set o f Targe ts . 
Propos i t i on 3.4 f o rma l i z e s the previous 
d iscuss ion . Since ind i v idua l s seek to maintain or 
increase status and s e l f - e s t e em , N channels with 
themselves as TARGETS are l i k e l y to have the most 
nega t i v e COST DIFFERENTIALS. Being the SOURCE o f N 
channel usage i s most l i k e l y to r e s u l t in being a 
subsequent TARGET o f an N channel . Since f a c t s and 
data are g e n e r a l l y neu t ra l , being the SOURCE o f a D 
channel usage i s l e as t l i k e l y to r e s u l t in being the 
TARGET o f an N channel in a subsequent per iod . 
We fur ther b e l i e v e that use o f I channels in i n t e r a c t i v e 
groups where the source i s known can be more c o s t l y ( i . e . , have 
more nega t i v e cost d i f f e r e n t i a l s ) than i s sometimes r e cogn i z ed . 
This i s because, in the absence o f f o rma l l y adopted, dominant 
c r i t e r i a f o r judgments, groups tend to r e s i s t i n i t i a l , new, 
uncommon, " r a d i c a l " so lut ion proposals when they are f i r s t 
o f f e r e d . Such a behav iora l assumption i s supported by informal 
observat ions and r e l a t ed research f i nd ings ( e . g . , Moscovici and 
Nemeth, 1974). Thus, being the SOURCE o f an I channel 
communication i s more l i k e l y to have the short-run consequence o f 
becoming the TARGET o f an N channel than o f a P channel 
communication. 
Simply put, s ince groups tend to r e s i s t i n i t i a l proposals , 
the most l i k e l y r ea c t i on to a proposal i s e i the r an e x p l i c i t or 
an i m p l i c i t nega t i ve eva luat ion ( the l a t t e r i s most o f t e n 
expressed by s i l e n c e or t o t a l l y ignor ing the proposal ) . The 
longer run consequences o f being an I channel source are l i k e l y 
to be more complex and depend on such f a c t o r s as the q u a l i t y o f 
the communication, the status o f the SOURCE, the groups 's 
i n t e r a c t i o n " h i s t o r y " in terms o f previous N and P channel usage 
o f the Source and the w i l l i ngness to fur ther use N channels (w i th 
the i r Expected Costs) in support o f the communication. 
In propos i t i on 3.5, we introduced a claim about the sign of 
the cost d i f f e r e n t i a l f o r the SOURCE o f an I channel 
communication. Propos i t i on 3.6 asse r t s the interdependence 
between usage o f N and I channels . In propos i t i on 3.7, we 
g ene ra l i z e in f luences from dyad unit in previous propos i t i ons to 
the group u n i t . 
P3.6 For a l l Ss, as the frequency o f usage o f N channels 
increases the EXPECTED COST o f I channels i n c r eases . 
In g ene ra l , soc ia l e t i q u e t t e or concerns about r e t a l i a t i o n 
l i m i t the express ion o f e x p l i c i t n ega t i v e e va lua t i ons . In much 
group i n t e r a c t i o n , ignor ing a message i s the way o f expressing 
nega t i ve e va lua t i on . Being i m p l i c i t , i t i s somewhat ambiguous 
25 
and thus has l e s s cost fo r i t s express ion . Once, however, Ss 
recogn ize that i n h i b i t i o n s against e x p l i c i t nega t i ve eva luat ions 
are not o p e r a t i v e , they increase the i r est imates o f the 
p r o b a b i l i t y that one o f t he i r proposals w i l l r e c e i v e an e x p l i c i t 
n ega t i v e e va lua t i on . 
P3.7 The COST DIFFERENTIAL of using a g iven channel i s the 
sum of the COST DIFFERENTIALS o f that channel and a l l 
other channels that are t i ed to i t . 
This propos i t i on r e f e r s to two kinds o f s i t u a t i o n s , those in 
which t a r g e t s cannot be segregated and those in which E channels 
are inter twined with D, I , P, and N channels . I f a Source must 
communicate to severa l t a r g e t s s imultaneously , that Source must 
an t i c ipa t e poss ib l e r eac t i ons from a l l t a r g e t s , not on ly the 
ta rge t for whom the message was intended. 
R e l a t i v e to using a channel to a s i ng l e t a r g e t , a source can 
expect both more ga ins and more cos ts from a mu l t i p l e channel 
communication, but we again consider the e f f e c t s o f the increase 
in cos t s to be more s i g n i f i c a n t . 
S i m i l a r l y , using E channe ls—transmit t ing in format ion about 
s e l f or th i rd part ies—may r e s u l t in both ga ins and c o s t s , but 
the same argument imp l i e s that cos t s are more i n f l u e n t i a l . Using 
an N channel to one t a rge t i s v e ry d i f f e r e n t from using that 
channel whi le a lso t ransmit t ing the f a c t o f S [ i ] n e g a t i v e l y 
evaluat ing T [ j ] through E channels. Public nega t i ve eva luat ions 
are more damaging than pr i va te ones and hence may i n v i t e c o s t l y 
r e t a l i a t i o n . 
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4. OUTCOMES 
Having o f f e r e d our propos i t i ons on channel cho ice , Expected 
Cost, and Cost D i f f e r e n t i a l , we now turn to propos i t i ons on 
Outcomes. 
P4. 1 In groups dea l ing with i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, the 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f a successful so lut ion i s an asymptotic 
increas ing func t ion o f the usage o f I channels. 
P4.2 In groups dea l ing with i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, the 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f a success fu l so lut ion i s a U-shaped 
funct ion o f the t o t a l usage o f N channels . 
P4.3 In groups dea l ing with i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, the 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f a success fu l so lut ion i s increased when 
N channel usage i s a monotone increasing funct ion o f 
t ime spent in i n t e r a c t i o n , and I channel usage i s a 
monotone decreasing funct ion o f i n t e rac t i on t ime. 
Here we r e s t a t e more f o rma l l y ideas that we presented 
e a r l i e r . We suggested that the so lut ion o f i l l - s t r u c t u r e d 
problems depends on both the generat ion o f many ideas and the 
operat ion o f nega t i v e eva luat ions to e l iminate unsa t i s f a c t o r y or 
l e s s than optimal proposa ls . Thus, n ega t i v e eva luat ions are a 
two-edged sword—necessary to the s e l e c t i on o f be t t e r proposals 
but i n h i b i t i n g the generat ion o f these proposa ls . 
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P4. 1 to P4. 3 r e s u l t from observat ions o f the sequencing o f 
c o g n i t i v e opera t i ons in i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problem so l v ing . Since 
ideat ion precedes eva luat ion and N channel usage i n h i b i t s I 
channel usage, we would an t i c i pa t e so lut ion q u a l i t y to be 
increased when N channel usage i s kept at low l e v e l s in e a r l y 
phases o f i n t e r a c t i on but allowed to increase s lowly as 
i n t e r a c t i o n proceeds and remain at i t s h ighest l e v e l throughout 
the f i n a l phases o f evaluat ion and consensus. 
Although the above propos i t i ons are pre l im inary , they do 
c o d i f y ideas about the r e l a t i o n o f s tatus to the transmission o f 
so lut ion proposals and nega t i ve eva luat ions and a l low us to 
generate some i n i t i a l hypotheses on in t e rac t i on and outcomes in 
s t a t u s - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and status homogeneous groups. 
Hypotheses. These hypotheses w i l l consider informat ion exchange 
in status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and status u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups. 
While we recogn i ze that even r e l a t i v e l y u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups 
have status h i e r a r c h i e s , we w i l l f o r expos i t o ry purposes consider 
a c l ass o f status-homogeneous groups in which there i s not a 
status h ie rarchy o f consequence. 
1. Status Factors and the Transmission o f Ideas and 
So lut ion Proposals 
H1.1 Frequency o f usage o f I channels w i l l be g rea te r 
in status-homogeneous groups than in groups that 
are status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . 
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H 1. 2 In s t a t u s - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups, the frequency o f 
I channels usage w i l l be d i r e c t l y r e l a t ed to the 
status l e v e l s o f ind i v idua l members. 
H1.3 In s t a t u s - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups, f requency o f I 
channels w i l l be i n v e r s e l y r e l a t ed to the 
frequency o f usage o f N channels . 
H1.4 The d i f f e r e n c e between the frequency of usage o f I 
channels in status homogeneous and status 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups w i l l decrease as the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f segregat ing channels i nc r eases . 
H1.5 The d i f f e r e n c e between the frequency of usage o f I 
channels in status homogeneous and status 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups w i l l be minimal when sources 
can use I channels anonymously. 
Hypothesis 1.1 maintains that equa l i z ing the expected costs 
o f using an I channel across group members w i l l not on ly equa l i z e 
the frequency o f member usage o f t h i s channel , but w i l l also 
increase t o t a l group usage o f the I channel . This i s because the 
expected cos t o f being the t a r g e t o f an N channel in response to 
being the source o f an I channel decreases as status d i f f e r e n c e s 
between members decrease . 
Hypothesis 1.2 app l i e s the frequent f i nd ings o f expec ta t ion 
s ta t es research that ind iv idua l p a r t i c i p a t i o n v a r i e s with 
ind i v idua l status to the generat ion and exchange o f i d eas . In 
the case o f I channel usage, higher status i n d i v i d u a l s f ace l e s s 
expected costs f o r being the t a rge t o f an N channel. 
A general c l imate e f f e c t o f the transmission o f n ega t i v e 
eva luat ions on the f l ow o f ideas i s represented in H1.3. Simply 
s ta t ed , inc reases in the frequency o f N channel usage as observed 
by ind i v idua l group members increase the p r o b a b i l i t y term o f 
Expected Cost ( i . e . , the p r o b a b i l i t y o f being an N channel t a r ge t 
as a consequence o f being an I channel source ) . 
H1.4 and H1.5 introduce the technology o f constrained 
informat ion or l im i t ed in t e rac t i on to information exchange in 
i n t e r a c t i v e groups. Res t r i c t ing informat ion and d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between publ ic and p r i v a t e dyadic communication have important 
imp l i ca t i on f o r e f f i c i e n c y in a t ta in ing the goa l s o f i n t e r a c t i ng 
group. Technology in the forms o f e l e c t r on i c communication (such 
as computer con ferences and mail drop procedures) a l low channel 
usage to be f l e x i b l y l im i t ed and expanded. 
In H1.4 we recogn i ze that when an uncommon idea can be 
communicated to an ind iv idua l rather than the e n t i r e group, the 
expected cost in terms o f status l o s s from becoming the t a r g e t o f 
a nega t i v e eva luat ion and having i t observed by other group 
members i s decreased. The expected cost o f publ ic eva luat ion to 
low status members i s highest in s tatus d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups. 
Segregating an N channel communication from members other than 
the dyad involved would be l i k e l y to reduce t h i s cos t and 
consequent ly increase the use o f I channels to a l e v e l c lose to 
that o f a status homogeneous group. 
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H1.5 points out that in the l i m i t i n g case where I channel 
communications are not p u b l i c a l l y matched to the i r source, the 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f becoming the t a rge t o f N channel communicaiton 
becomes unrelated to the generat ion o f i d eas . Thus there would 
l i t t l e or no d i f f e r e n c e s in expected cos ts from I channel usage 
in status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and status homogeneous groups. 
2. Status Factors and the Transmission o f Negative 
Eva luat ions . 
H2. 1 Frequency of usage o f N channels w i l l be greaer in 
s tatus d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups than in groups that 
are status homogeneous. 
H2. 2 In s t a t u s - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups, the frequency o f 
N channels usage w i l l be d i r e c t l y r e l a t ed to the 
status l e v e l of ind i v idua l members. 
H2.3 In status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups, higher status 
members w i l l most o f t en be the source and lower 
s tatus members w i l l most o f t e n be the t a r g e t s o f N 
channel communications. 
H2.4 The d i f f e r e n c e between frequency o f usage o f N 
channels in status homogeneous and status 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups w i l l decrease as the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f segregat ing channels inc r eases . 
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H2.5 The d i f f e r e n c e between the average frequency o f 
usage o f N channels in status homogeneous and 
status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups w i l l be minimal when 
sources can use I channels anonymously. 
Hypotheses 2.1 and 2 .2 p a r a l l e l H1. 1 and 1.2 and claim that 
the transmission o f nega t i ve eva luat ions i s s imi lar in operat ion 
to the transmission o f ideas and so lu t ion proposa ls . 
In H2. 3 we recogn i ze that the cos t d i f f e r e n t i a l o f N channel 
usage w i l l always be more nega t i v e f o r low status members than 
for high status members. This impl ies that in an exchange o f N 
channel communications, a lower status member w i l l f ace a g rea ter 
l o s s o f s tatus and/or s e l f - e s t e em. The re f o r e , lower status 
members w i l l avoid being the source o f communications that r e s u l t 
in t h e i r being the t a r g e t o f an N channel . 
Hypotheses 2.4 and 2.5 o f f e r con j ec tures on the consequences 
o f constra in ing information t r ans f e r s to l e s s than f u l l member 
exchanges and removing source l a b e l s . (Such computer-aided 
mod i f i c a t i ons o f i n t e rac t i on have important imp l i ca t i ons for the 
source, amount, and type o f in format ion exchanged) . 
In H2.4 we an t i c i pa t e that reducing or e l iminat ing 
E-channels in status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups w i l l reduce the cost 
d i f f e r e n t i a l o f N channel usage and increase i t s f requency. 
S i m i l a r l y , in H2.5 we an t i c i pa t e that removing source l a b e l s from 
I-channel usage w i l l reduce the cos t d i f f e r e n t i a l o f using t h i s 
channel in status d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups and increase i t s usage to 
approximate l e v e l s observed in status homogeneous groups. 
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In our f i n a l set o f hypotheses, we turn d i r e c t l y to e f f e c t s 
o f communication s t ructure on informat ion exchange. We focus on 
the t rans f e r o f nega t i ve eva luat ions because o f t he i r in f luence 
on group i n t e r a c t i o n and i d e a t i o n . 
3. Communication Structure and the Transmission o f 
Nega t i ve Eva luat ions . 
H3. 1 Frequency o f usage o f N channels in i n t e r a c t i v e 
groups w i l l be g rea te r when the communication 
structure al lows p r i v a t e dyadic ( s i n g l e channel) 
exchange rather than public (mu l t i p l e channel) 
exchange. 
H3. 2 Frequency o f N channel usage w i l l be g rea te r when 
the source can be anonymous than when the source ' s 
i d e n t i t y i s known. 
H3.3 The use o f an N channel w i l l have l e s s impact in 
s i n g l e channel media than in mu l t i p l e channel 
/ 
media. 
Arguments that mu l t i p l e channels i n v o l v e g rea te r EXPECTED 
COSTS than s i n g l e channels, and that anonymous Sources have 
minimal EXPECTED COST f o r using a channel also prov ide the bas is 
for H3. 1 and 3.2. Hypothesis 3.3, however depends on a s l i g h t l y 
more complex argument. The reasoning about lower EXPECTED COSTS 
impl ies l e s s fear o f r e t a l i a t i o n on the part o f a po t en t i a l 
Source. I f a l l Sources have l e s s fear o f " r e t a l i a t i o n , " i . e . , 
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being the t a r g e t o f a nega t i v e e va lua t i on , then the behavior o f 
a l l sources i s l e s s constra ined. A g iven l e v e l of usage o f N 
channels w i l l constrain the usage o f other channels to a much 
grea te r extent in pub l i c (mu l t i p l e channel) communication 
s t ructures than in pr i va te ( s i n g l e channel) communication. 
Hypotheses 3-1 to 3^3 suggest the use o f communication 
technology to c rea te and modi fy communication s t ructure as one 
po t en t i a l means o f r e a l i z i n g advantages o f s tatus d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
f o r problem so lv ing whi le m i t i ga t ing i t s d isadvantages . For 
example, when information exchange i s r e s t r i c t e d to dyadic 
communication, the expected cost o f i n i t i a t i n g an A channel 
commmunication in terms o f subsequently becoming a publ ic t a r ge t 
o f an N channel communication should decrease . 
Imposing s t ructure on member communication o f f e r s s imi lar 
po t en t i a l b e n e f i t s to idea generat ion in groups with even minimal 
status di f e r e n t i a t i o n . I f I channels are used anonymously, the 
expected cost o f i n i t i a t i n g an N communication should decrease . 
The forego ing hypotheses exempl i f y t e s tab l e imp l i ca t i ons of 
the propos i t i ons we have presented. These hypotheses together 
with the p ropos i t i ons on which they are based on seek to provide 
add i t i ona l ins ight in to the in f luence o f s t ruc ture on informat ion 
exchange and problem so lv ing in i n t e r a c t i v e groups. In the next 
and f i n a l s e c t i on , we w i l l b r i e f l y summarize the e f f o r t s o f t h i s 
work and suggest d i r e c t i o n s for subsequent theory and research . 
Scope o f the Theory . We pos i t four cond i t i ons under which the 
theory i s app l i cab l e and which must be taken into account in 
construct ing t e s t s o f the model. These a re : 
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1. The group must be engaged in a group task. 
2. There are no norms in the s i tua t i on that proscr ibe or 
mi t i ga te nega t i v e e va lua t i ons . 
3. Members cannot l eave the group unt i l the group achieves 
i t s g oa l s or disbands. 
4. The on ly r e l e van t external eva luat ions o f the group or 
i t s members are those fo r group success or f a i l u r e in 
accomplishing the group task . 
By group task we mean a task that r equ i r e s resources 
( i n f o rma t i on , knowledge, ma t e r i a l s , and s k i l l s ) that no s ing l e 
ind iv idua l possesses so that no s ing l e ind iv idua l can so l ve the 
problem or achieve the task o b j e c t i v e s without at l e a s t some 
input from other group members. This d e f i n i t i o n r equ i r e s that 
the task imposes some degree o f interdependence in the group. 
The second cond i t ion addresses cu l tu ra l norms that emphasize 
courtesy and po l i t eness to such a degree that nega t i ve 
eva luat ions d i r e c t ed to an ind iv idua l are taboo. Po l i t eness 
norms operate in a wide v a r i e t y o f task s i t u a t i o n s ; indeed, some 
techniques f o r enhancing group problem so lv ing d e l i b e r a t e l y 
invoke norms against d i r e c t disagreement wi th , or disparagement 
o f , ano the r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n . While such norms may be conducive to 
group success, t h e i r operat ion i n t e r f e r e s with the processes 
underlying the present theo ry . Hence, we r u l e out such 
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s i t u a t i o n s as t e s t i ng grounds. While there are probably ve ry few 
natural s i tua t i ons with no normative cons t ra in t s on the 
communication o f nega t i v e eva lua t i on , in construct ing experiments 
to t es t t h i s theory we want to minimize as much as poss ib le the 
operat ion o f such norms. 
The group has l e s s power over ind i v idua ls who can f r e e l y 
choose to l e a v e than over members who are constrained to remain 
in the group. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f l eav ing the group m i t i g a t e s the 
impact o f nega t i v e eva lua t ions from o thers ; fur thermore , the 
threat that a member might qui t operates to i n h i b i t d i r e c t i n g 
nega t i v e eva luat ions to that member, p a r t i c u l a r l y where 
interdependence among members i s high. Thus add i t iona l complex 
processes a r i s e when members have the opt ion to r es i gn from the 
group. The purpose o f our th i rd cond i t i on , then, i s to s i m p l i f y 
s i tua t i ons in which to t es t the theory by reducing the e f f e c t s o f 
add i t iona l processes. To be sure, even when phys i c a l l y l eav ing 
the group i s not an op t i on , i t i s o f t en poss ib l e f o r an 
ind iv idua l to withdraw psy cho l o g i c a l l y and the f r equen t l y 
observed lack o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f low status group members may 
r e f l e c t , in par t , such psycho log ica l withdrawal. While i t may 
not be f e a s i b l e to e l iminate the p o s s i b i l i t y o f psycho log ica l 
withdrawal e n t i r e l y , we need to design research that makes such 
withdrawal v e r y c o s t l y and t h e r e f o r e h i gh l y u n l i k e l y . 
Res t r i c t ing external eva luat ions to those d i r e c t ed at group 
success or f a i l u r e a lso serves to s i m p l i f y s i t u a t i o n s in which to 
i n v e s t i g a t e the theory . I f a member's act ions in t h i s group w i l l 
lead to p o s i t i v e or nega t i ve eva luat ions from some other group, 
then the i n d i v i d u a l ' s ac t ions are a f f e c t e d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y by 
36 
concerns for other groups and the weight o f the attachments to 
the competing groups. The in ten t i on o f t h i s scope r e s t r i c t i o n i s 
to exclude e f f e c t s o f soc ia l comparison processes and r e f e r ence 
group c o n f l i c t s on the problem so lv ing a c t i v i t i e s o f the group 
( c f . , Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Ze ld i t ch , 1 977). 
Undoubtedly, these scope cons t ra in t s are too r e s t r i c t i v e in 
the i r present form. As we deve lop the theory we hope to re lax 
and perhaps e l im inate one or more o f them e n t i r e l y . 
Summary and Conclusions 
We have presented the i n t i a l formulat ion o f a theory o f 
information exchange mediated by group s t ruc ture . We b e l i e v e 
that the theory p rov ides a framework within which to consider the 
e f f e c t s o f s t ructure on in t e rac t i on and outcomes o f group problem 
solv ing . 
The basic unit o f the theory i s the "channel" and channels 
are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d according to source, t a r g e t , and content mode 
o f a communication. We d i s t ingu i sh f i v e modes: Ideas , data , 
p o s i t i v e e va lua t i ons , nega t i v e eva lua t i ons , and what we term 
"source and/or th i rd party d a t a . " Source or th i rd party data 
channels t y p i c a l l y r e f e r to communications where person k 
observes that Source [ i ] n e g a t i v e l y evaluates Target [ j ] . The 
propos i t i ons o f the theory l i nk channel usage and channel choice 
to the status s t ructure o f the group through propos i t i ons about 
the cost o f r e c e i v i n g nega t i ve eva luat ions from various sources 
who d i f f e r in s ta tus . For i l l - s t r u c t u r e d problems, the theory 
r e l a t e s success fu l so lut ion to the frequency o f usage o f Idea and 
Negat ive eva luat ion channels and also to the time pat terns o f 
t h i s usage. 
In the theory , usage ( o r ant ic ipated usage) of N channels i s 
the p r inc ipa l mechanism that d r i v e s the process, and d i f f e r e n c e s 
in member status determine the amount and t a r g e t s o f such usage. 
While other wr i t e r s have noted the importance o f nega t i ve 
eva lua t i ons in group process ( e . g . , Bales, 1951 , 1953), the 
present theory s y s t ema t i c a l l y exp l i ca t e s key antecedents and 
major consequences o f v a r i a t i o n in the communication o f nega t i v e 
eva luat ions in problem so lv ing groups. 
Receiving nega t i ve eva luat ions from others can reduce an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s status in the group or diminish his s e l f - e s t e e m . 
Fa i lure to accomplish group o b j e c t i v e s can have s imi lar 
consequences. Hence, avoiding such cos t s invo l v es an ind iv idua l 
in d e l i c a t e l y balancing when to communicate and when not t o , what 
to communicate and what to avoid communicating, to whom to 
i n i t i a t e and to whom to respond, whether to communicate pub l i c l y 
or p r i v a t e l y , whether to i d e n t i f y onese l f or to be anonymous, 
e t c . In terms o f the theory , an ind iv idua l dea l s with these 
cho ices by choosing a channel, and the p r o b a b i l i t y o f choosing 
each type o f channel depends in part on the status s t ructure o f 
the group and the i n d i v i d u a l ' s pos i t i on in that s t ruc ture . 
We pos i t that the p r o b a b i l i t y o f choosing a channel v a r i e s 
inve r se l y with " c o s t d i f f e r e n t i a l " ( the d i f f e r e n c e between 
expected l oss and gain in , e . g . , s t a t u s ) . We also asser t that 
nega t i ve eva luat ions and ideas are more l i k e l y to have negat i ve 
cost d i f f e r e n t i a l s than data or p o s i t i v e e va lua t i ons . Moreover, 
we claim that the cos t d i f f e r e n t i a l for transmission o f ideas 
increases as member status d i f f e r e n c e s inc r ease , f o r a l l but the 
highest status group member. As a consequence o f t h i s ana l y s i s , 
the transmission o f ideas in a group i s l i k e l y to decrease as 
status d i f f e r e n c e s i n c r ea s e . 
The l a s t sect ion presented three se ts o f hypotheses. 
Although we do not r i g o r o u s l y d e r i v e these hyotheses, they are 
g e n e r a l l y cons is tent with the l i n e s o f reasoning we have 
e x p l i c a t e d . The f i r s t two sets r e l a t e status f a c t o r s to the 
communication o f ideas and nega t i ve eva lua t i ons , while the th i rd 
set dea l s with the e f f e c t s o f the communication s t ructure on the 
communication o f nega t i ve eva lua t i ons . Where the communication 
s t ructure al lows the segregat ion o f channels and/or the anonymity 
o f sources, the theory assumes that i t i s poss ib le to reduce the 
nega t i ve cos t s o f channel usage. Thus we hypothesize that use o f 
nega t i v e channels w i l l increase when pr i va te and/or anonymous 
channels are a v a i l a b l e , and that the impact o f nega t i v e 
eva lu ta t ions w i l l be reduced in such s t ruc tures . I f these 
hypotheses are supported, then such s t ruc tures could m i t i ga t e 
some o f the e f f e c t s o f s tatus d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ( K i e s l e r , 198?) . 
The heur i s t i c framework we have presented c l e a r l y r equ i r e s 
e l abo ra t i on , c l a r i f i c a t i o n , and i n t e g r a t i o n . Further development 
o f the theory , however, would b e n e f i t from a set o f empir i ca l 
s tudies that would ind ica te which ideas o f the theory are 
adequate, which need m o d i f i c a t i o n , and which should be abandoned. 
With the advent o f computer-mediated i n t e r a c t i o n ( H i l t z e t a l , 
19??, K i e s l e r , 1984, Cohen, f o r thcoming ) , we now have the 
technology to c r ea t e experiments where we can focus s p e c i f i c a l l y 
on the use o f nega t i v e channels, f o r example, and the e f f e c t s o f 
such usage. We are in the process o f deve loping an experimental 
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paradigm that w i l l a l low us to compare f a c e - t o - f a c e with var ious 
degree o f r e s t r i c t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . 
I f the basic ideas o f the theory are supported emp i r i c a l l y , 
then there are s c i e n t i f i c and p rac t i ca l imp l i ca t i ons that need to 
be explored. This framework should enable us to recons ider the 
problem of the sequencing o f problem so lv ing operat ions and 
information exchange; we intend to reconst ruc t our propos i t i ons 
to deal with developments in time over the l i f e o f the group. In 
add i t i on , the theory can be elaborated to prov ide gu ide l i nes for 
enhancing group performance in dea l ing with i l l - s t r u c t u r e d 
problem so l v ing . For example, one appropr ia te o b j e c t i v e f o r 
deve loping our framework would be to answer the quest ion, "How 
can groups r e t a in the b e n e f i t s but minimize the negat i ve 
consequences o f s tatus s t ruc tures on in format ion exchange?" 
Further cons idera t i on o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s as wel l as 
add i t i ona l background f o r our theory are presented in S i l v e r , 
Cohen, and Rainwater (1988) . We b e l i e v e the importance o f 
in format ion exchange at a l l l e v e l s o f s o c i a l o rgan i za t i on 
underscores the po t en t i a l va lue o f t h i s l i n e o f i nqu i r y . 
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